Travel Demand Management > Congestion Pricing                    Printer-friendly version

• Rationale
• System Description
  • Types of Congestion Pricing
  • The Effects of Different Types of Congestion Pricing
  • How is Congestion Pricing Implemented?
• Assessment
  • Key Results
  • Benefits
  • Costs
  • Implementation Challenges
• Where is Congestion Pricing Implemented?
• Case Studies
• References

RATIONALE

Congestion pricing monetizes and internalizes the cost of the delay that travelers impose on other travelers by using facilities when they are congested. Congestion pricing charges motorists a toll for using a particular stretch of highway, bridge, or lane or for entering a particular area during congested periods. It is a market or demand-based strategy designed to encourage a shift of peak period trips to: a. off-peak periods; b. routes away from congested facilities or c. high-occupancy vehicles or transit during the peak demand periods. It may lead to a reduction in total trips and in the long term may motivate changes in residential and/or workplace locations. Congestion pricing is made possible in part by electronic toll collection technologies, which allow for fast and fully automated toll collection. See the ITS Gateway Electronic Toll Collection Summary for more information.

During the evening rush, 25% or more of the cars on the road are not people coming home from work. A peak-period toll could encourage some of these discretionary travelers to make their trips off-peak, or to use less congested routes. Many economists argue that urban traffic congestion is virtually impossible to solve without some sort of congestion pricing to allocate limited roadway capacity (Goodwin, 1997). By recognizing that trips have different values at different times and places and for different individuals, congestion pricing provides incentives for more efficient use of existing highway capacity; it can also signal the need for future capacity expansion. Because congestion grows rapidly as roads near capacity, even a small reduction in the number of cars on the road can substantially reduce congestion-related delays and crashes.

Several other terms are commonly used to refer to direct time-of-travel charges for roadway use, including congestion pricing, value pricing and cordon tolls. See "Types of Congestion Pricing" below for more details.

1. Congestion Pricing (Variable Tolls on Toll Facilities)
Congestion pricing is a type of road pricing intended to reduce traffic congestion problems by encouraging travelers to shift to other times, routes and modes. Tolls are significantly higher during congested periods and lower or non-existent during uncongested periods (called "time variable pricing"). Toll rates can be based on a fixed schedule, or they can be dynamic, meaning that rates change depending on the level of congestion that exists at a particular time. Travelers passing through a toll facility with variable tolls must pay the required toll regardless of their lane (unless they are in a designated free HOV lane); they can choose when to drive through the toll plaza but not how much they will pay at a given point in time. Since August 1998 in Lee County, Florida, commuters have been offered reduced tolls on two bridges during the "shoulder" periods immediately before and after the peak demand times for those bridges. See "Case Studies" for more details.

2. Value Pricing
In contrast to congestion pricing, value pricing offers travelers a choice regarding how much they want to pay at a toll plaza at a given point in time, depending on which lane they choose to drive in. In the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Congress continued federal support for pricing initiatives by creating the Value-Pricing Pilot Program. This program replaces the Congestion-Pricing Pilot Program in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). Both technical and financial support has been provided for many state and local value-pricing initiatives.

There are two special types of value pricing: HOT lanes and FAIR lanes.

• HOT Lanes
  High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes are high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes that also allow lower occupancy vehicle users if they pay a toll. This allows excess HOV lane capacity to be used while maintaining an incentive for mode shifting. HOT lanes are often proposed as a compromise between HOV lanes and road tolling as solutions to traffic congestion. HOV lanes have been converted to HOT lanes in San Diego on I-15 and in Houston on I-10. See "Case Studies" for more details.
  
  
• "FAIR" Lanes
  Fast and Intertwined Regular (FAIR) Lanes are a form of congestion pricing in which revenues from electronic tolled lanes are credited to motorists using adjacent lanes (DeCorla-Souza, 2000). Credits could be used as toll payments on days when these drivers choose to use the Fast lanes, or as payment for transit, paratransit or parking at commuter park-and-ride lots in the corridor. This is intended to overcome political objections to congestion pricing by insuring that all road users directly benefit: people who choose to pay for the use of tolled lanes benefit from reduced congestion, and those who use other lanes benefit from financial credits. Motorists will not lose mobility, and overall freeway throughput actually increases. For more information on related equity issues, see the "Equity" section under "Key Results."

3. Cordon Tolls
In a cordon pricing plan, drivers pay to enter and/or exit a whole town area or the inner parts of a city. Cordon tolls are mainly used in Europe. Cordon pricing may be implemented for financing, efficiency, congestion relief, and/or environmental pricing purposes.

The Effects of Different Types of Congestion Pricing

Congestion pricing is intended as a demand management strategy, and it is implemented on existing roadways to reduce the need to add roadway capacity. Its success depends on a host of variables such as the project objectives, marketing strategies, user acceptance, and whether there are viable travel alternatives or alternate routes. While it is often difficult to isolate the range of travel impacts of an isolated congestion pricing project, success can nonetheless be measured in terms of reduced congestion delay and avoided roadway costs. In addition, congestion pricing has been found to be most effective when people have travel alternatives, alternate routes, alternate departure times, transit, or ridesharing.

While analyzing results, one should keep in mind that results may be impacted by events not directly related to the project (such as construction on a nearby freeway) or by a planning process that does not take into account the full range of issues related to congestion projects. For the time being, research results in the U.S. seem to indicate mostly shifts in departure times, routes and modest shifts to HOVs. The results in Europe and Asia also indicate shifts in travel time, routes and more important shifts to HOVs in addition to a small percentage shift to transit. This is likely due to more widespread transit systems in Europe and Asia.

How is Congestion Pricing Implemented?

Congestion pricing schemes are generally implemented by highway agencies or local authorities. Sometimes other levels of government are involved in the approval process (for example, in the U.S. federal law restricts tolling on the Interstate Highway System).

A portion of revenues must be dedicated to tolling infrastructure and labor costs.

ASSESSMENT

Travel Impacts
Congestion pricing can have a number of travel impacts depending upon the variability and range of prices, the price elasticity of demand for the tolled facility, the level of availability of travel alternatives, and schedule flexibility. Economists measure price sensitivity using price elasticities, which is defined as the percentage change in consumption caused by a percentage change in price. "Prices" in this case represent perceived user costs, which can include money, time, and discomfort. For example, a price elasticity of -0.1 for urban highways would indicate that a 10% increase in tolls would reduce vehicle use by 1% if everything else remained the same. However, if delay were also reduced then the "price" including time will not necessarily be greater.

Potential travel impacts are:

• A change in the time of travel: shift of peak traffic to off-peak with a consequent reduction of peak period traffic.
• A shift in mode: from automobile to alternative travel modes (transit, carpooling, cycling etc.), gradually reducing traffic.
• A shift in routes: to untolled roads or less tolled roads.
• Linked trips: more combination of activities on a single trip.
• A change in destination: for non-work trips, shorter trips would potentially be made; for work trips there could actually be changes in work or residential location.
• Land use: in the long-run, particularly if there were congestion pricing on a regional level, land use patterns would be affected. It is still unclear in what ways land use could be affected. Some argue that it would discourage sprawl; others believe it would increase decentralization.

As illustrated by this list, the range of behavioral adaptations to congestion pricing is quite complex. The main determinant of the level of impact is the price elasticity, which fluctuates depending upon the region, country and availability of substitutes (i.e. alternatives to the automobile, alternate routes, schedule flexibility). Cities with excellent public transportation systems will normally have higher price elasticities because car travel will be more sensitive to price changes (since people can take transit more easily). Many studies (Hirschman et al. 1995; Harvey, 1994; Mekky, 1999) have arrived at price elasticity estimates of between -0.1 to -0.4 for urban highways. Much research is still needed to identify impact trends, particularly long term ones, since there are very few cases of regional congestion pricing projects. ). In re-authorizing the TEA-21 Value-pricing program as a pilot program, Congress recognized that much remains to be learned about the effects of value-pricing in different urban settings.

Equity
Equity refers to the distribution of benefits and costs resulting from a policy decision. There are three main objections to the implementation of congestion pricing on equity grounds (all three objections are not necessarily true):

1. Lower income people may be priced off the road during the peak period.
2. Lower income people who pay the toll pay a higher proportion of their income in tolls than high income drivers.
3. It is a double tax: motorists are being asked to pay to use a facility that was initially financed through gasoline and other taxes.

Despite these objections, studies of users of the "value priced" lanes on Rt 91 in San Diego, for example, have shown that a significant proportion of the frequent users are both in higher and lower income brackets. This shows that people who are less wealthy still value their time and thus are willing to pay a toll to save time. Moreover, value pricing systems like "FAIR lanes" may allay equity concerns because they allow for all motorists to benefit by either saving time or acquiring financial credits.

In the final analysis, the equity of congestion pricing depends on the how the collected revenues are redistributed to travelers and on whether there are available travel alternatives (Giulano 1994; Litman 1996). Congestion pricing will only be inequitable and regressive if low-income drivers are not adequately compensated for the higher tolls. Congestion pricing will certainly be more inequitable and regressive in the absence of viable transportation alternatives. If the value to the consumer of the saved time plus a portion of the redistributed revenues (if these are returned in some manner such as direct transfers or other mechanisms) is larger than the cost of the toll, then the consumer is better off. Similarly, for the traveler who chooses free but congested roads, if the cost of waiting in line is lower than the benefit of the transfer, then she or he is also better off. Under the right redistribution policy most people across income groups can be made better off (whether one chooses to wait in congestion or pay to save time).

Regarding the double tax issue, critics often ignore the fact that it costs more to provide capacity for the peak period than for off peak. This is the rationale for peak load pricing of utilities. With smaller peaks, less capacity is needed.

Benefits

Congestion pricing provides a number of potential benefits:

• Reduction of peak-period delay
• Reduction in the need for new construction to serve the peak period demand.
• Enhancement of transportation choices in the case where not all lanes are tolled, as with a high-occupancy/toll lane: With both tolled and free lanes the traveler has three options: a. drive free in congestion b. ride a bus or take a carpool in the dedicated free lane(s) or c. drive alone on the HOT lane(s) and pay a toll. Individuals who choose to avoid congestion tolls and shift to alternative modes may experience this as a disbenefit.
• Reduced emissions of pollutants and greenhouse gases and reduced energy consumption. Reduced congestion will reduce emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide and will reduce fuel consumption. If overall trips are reduced, emissions of nitrogen oxides will also be reduced.

Costs

• Toll collections infrastructure, staffing and enforcement
• Inconvenience to motorists: mainly the time required to pay the tolls.
• Financial costs to consumers for paying the toll: this last element is actually not a cost but an economic transfer from the travelers to the toll authority. How this transfer affects the consumer ultimately depends on how much she or he values the timesavings and the redistributed revenues (if at all) over the cost of the toll.

Implementation and Operational Challenges

The main challenge to the implementation of congestion pricing is opposition from groups who consider themselves worse off once pricing is established. Users generally accept congestion pricing on a single lane that was not previously available if other lanes are free, as with HOT lanes. Where all previously free lanes are tolled, there is often opposition because the toll is perceived as double taxation and because of hardship on less affluent people. In addition, a main challenge to establishing cordon tolls is agreeing on the location of the cordon. One of the big lessons learned from many of the congestion pricing projects is that marketing, public education and involvement with the project, and transparency in terms of toll revenue redistribution are essential to gain wide support for the project.

Most technological components for congestion pricing (electronic toll collection systems) have been tested and demonstrated throughout the world and are ready for widespread deployment.

CASE STUDIES

Congestion Pricing
Value Pricing
Cordon Tolls
Other Projects

Congestion Pricing (Variable Tolls on Toll Facilities)

Westchester County, NY (Tappan Zee Bridge) The following information is excerpted from "Mobilizing the Region - Sept. 1999".

The NY State Thruway Authority has finished the Tappan Zee Bridge toll policy study it began in 1996 at the request of the Rockland and Westchester County Executives. Results show that even modest price differentials between peak and off-peak toll rates stand to significantly reduce rush hour congestion on the chronically clogged bridge.

The base Tappan Zee Bridge toll is $3.00, collected only in the east-bound direction. But drivers using the bridge at least 17 times per month pay only $1 - the Thruway Authority estimates that over 75% of rush hour drivers pay the $1 rate.

The study finds that the direct effect of higher peak prices is the shift of a significant number of drivers to other travel times. It also found that some travelers - who now shun peak hours due to congestion - return to them once the peak/off-peak price break has eased traffic flow.

Toll Scenarios and Estimated Peak Hour Traffic Volume Effects

Present-day toll is $1 for daily commuters. "Shift into peak" under pricing scenarios represents drivers who now avoid the peak because of congestion, but would shift back and pay the higher toll to take advantage of the freer flow of traffic created by the peak/off-peak price break. Source: Tappan Zee Congestion Relief Study Final Report

Surveys of Tappan Zee Bridge travelers conducted as part of the study found that over 50% of all respondents either strongly favored or somewhat favored congestion pricing on the Tappan Zee Bridge, once they had received some information about congestion pricing's likely effects and benefits, while about 30% were opposed or strongly opposed. There was virtually no difference in opinion between low, middle or high income levels.

The survey also found that many travelers have some flexibility and will actively consider time-of-day shifts when peak period prices are increased. Interviews with I-287 corridor employers indicated that "congestion is a problem, contributing to employee tardiness and stress." Some indicated that "it is difficult to attract and retain employees from west of the Hudson River." Many employers felt that an incentive pricing program would not necessarily affect customers or clients, many of which are already located in Westchester County.

Toronto, Canada, Highway 407 (www.407etr.com) from VTPI
Highway 407, the Express Toll Route (ETR), is a multi-lane, electronic highway running 69 kilometres across the top of the Greater Toronto Area, from Highway 403 in Oakville to Highway 48 in Markham. The first phase of the Highway opened in 1997 and runs from Highway 410 in Brampton to Highway 404 in Markham. It was constructed in a partnership between Canadian Highways International Corporation, a private company specializing in highway development, and the Province of Ontario. It is now owned by 407-ETR International Inc. Fees are 10¢ per kilometer during weekday peaks, 8¢ per kilometer during weekends and off-peak periods, and 4¢ per kilometer at night. About 70% of tolls are collected using electronic transponder cards that deduct charges from prepaid accounts, and 30% using a license plate photography billing system. Speeds on Highway 407 are about double that of parallel free highways. Peak-hour traffic volumes average 11,000 to 12,000 vehicles. Surveys indicate a high level of user satisfaction

Seoul, South Korea
Transport officials in Seoul, South Korea recently published a report on the first-year impacts of its congestion pricing demonstration in the Nam Sam Tunnels (Tunnel 1 and Tunnel 3) in downtown Seoul. To mitigate peak-period congestion in the Nam Sam Tunnels, officials converted the fixed tolls in the tunnels to a variable structure, where single occupant vehicle commuters pay a higher toll during the peak (from 7:00 am to 9:00 p.m.), and a lower toll during the off-peak. Peak-period commuters saw tolls increase from the equivalent of $0.20 cents (US) in mid-1996, to about $1.50 today.

Data collected from mid-1996 through 1997 and reported at the Second Annual U.S.-Korean Roads Workshop on May 12, 1998, indicate that daily traffic levels in the Tunnels dropped by 13.6 percent after the first year of the demonstration (from 90,400 to 78,100 vehicles) and travel speeds in the tunnels increased by 38 percent (from 21.6 to 29.8 kph). Furthermore, the volume of carpools, buses, and taxis, which travel free of charge through the tunnels, increased by 146 percent, 148 percent, and 103 percent, respectively, with a resulting increase in the number of persons carried through the tunnels of 57.5 percent. The primary bypass route saw an increase in traffic levels of 5.7 percent after the first year of the demonstration, but with no detrimental effect on travel speeds, indicating that the Nam Sam Tunnels congestion pricing demonstration has resulted in a more efficient distribution of traffic across the highway network.

Value Pricing

San Diego: Interstate 15 Express Lane Program
In December 1996, a 2-lane, 8-mile reversible HOV-2 facility in the median of Interstate 15 (I-15) in San Diego, California was opened to a limited number of paying solo drivers who purchased monthly "ExpressPass" permits for $70. Prior to the initiation of this project, use of the I-15 HOV-2 facility was restricted to carpools with two or more passengers, motorcycles and emergency vehicles. With the advent of this pilot project proposed by San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG), carpools and other authorized vehicles continue to ride free, while solo permit holding motorists are allowed to use the HOV-2 facility. This is commonly referred to as HOV Buy-In, or a high occupancy toll (HOT).

A fully automated dynamic pricing pilot project on I-15 began on March 30, 1998. The system deducts per-trip fees from pre-established accounts instead of charging a flat monthly fee. To accommodate the switch to dynamic pricing, monthly ExpressPass permits were replaced by windshield-mounted transponders, which allow the flexibility of varying charges with the level of congestion. Fees are assessed using overhead readers and vary depending on the real-time congestion levels in the HOV lanes. Traffic flow is monitored in the HOV lanes to ensure that operating conditions do not degrade below free-flow conditions (LOS C). Carpools and other authorized vehicles continue to use the facility free of charge.

A posted schedule informs patrons of the highest toll they should expect during the hours of operation. Under regular conditions, tolls vary from $0.50 to $4.00. In exceptional circumstances, when heavy congestion in the free lanes causes a sharp increase in demand in the HOT lanes, the maximum toll may increase to $8.00 to prevent unacceptable operating conditions in the HOT lanes. Tolls can change every 6 minutes at $ 0.50 increments and variable message signs inform drivers of the current toll. Depending on traffic in the HOV lanes, the fee may be lower than the posted schedule. If the toll changes during a motorist’s trip on the lanes, the system algorithms charge the user the lowest toll they may have seen on the message signs.

To provide an alternative to the tolled road or freeway congestion, a new express bus service has been introduced as part of the pricing program.

A comprehensive monitoring and evaluation effort, conducted by San Diego State University, is underway to assess the project's impacts on traffic volumes and speeds, modal usage, operational issues, costs, revenues, acceptance, and business activities.

An overall evaluation report released in May 2000 indicates positive results on several fronts. The following results are from the executive summary of the report.

The key traffic-related results are as follows:

• There was substantially better utilization of the Express Lanes, as both HOVs and FasTrak vehicles increased over time. The transition from the ExpressPass to the FasTrak phase showed that both versions of pricing - monthly permits and dynamic per-trip pricing - were implementable solutions that could generate sufficient revenue to fund transit service improvements in the I-15 corridor.
• The revenue raised allowed the start of a new I-15 express bus called the Inland Breeze (Route 990) in November 1997. However, the new service did not attract many new transit riders and attracted less than one in five "choice" riders, who had a car available to them.
• There was a significant increase in HOVs using the I-15 Express Lanes. · There was a significant decrease in SOV violation rates in the I-15 Express Lanes. The reduction in SOV violations is likely due to the project-funded California Highway Patrol (CHP) enforcement of the Express Lanes.
• The project's ability to relieve traffic congestion on the I-15 main lanes is inconclusive at this point in the evaluation. Results regarding users of the system: · I-15 ExpressPass/FasTrak users were found to be travelers who drive alone virtually every day for work-related purposes. Dynamic analysis showed that the prior mode of the FasTrak users was primarily solo driving and not carpooling.
• Users expressed satisfaction with the reduction in their travel time, the reliability of on-time arrival at their destinations, and the perception of improved safety of the I-15 Express Lanes.
• FasTrak participants strongly agreed with the concept to allow solo drivers to use the Express Lanes for a fee. The majority of all other respondents also strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the pricing concept.
• Compared to a certain price sensitivity of ExpressPass users, there are indications that the majority of FasTrak users was insensitive to specific posted prices. In addition, the deciding factor whether to use FasTrak on the I-15 Express Lanes for the majority of customers was traffic and not costs.
• The Fall 1997 Attitudinal Panel Survey revealed both a lack of awareness and a lack of support among ExpressPass users and other I-15 users for using program revenue to fund transit improvements in the I-15 corridor. The awareness of revenue use increased from four percent in Fall 1997 to 16 percent in Spring 1998, and then to 19 percent in Fall 1998. Initial support for using the program revenue for I-15 transit improvements was very low in Fall 1997, but increased slightly in Fall 1998.

Some key results from the Continuation Study to evaluate the Impacts of the SR-91 Value-Priced Express Lanes: Final Report:

• The toll lanes have attracted a substantial share of the traffic using the SR 91 corridor.
• Toll road traffic in the morning peak direction is consistently less than in the afternoon peak direction, when congestion in the free lanes is worse.
• Even though more than 80% of peak period travelers on SR 91 are engaged in home-to-work travel, most commuters do not use the toll lanes on a daily basis. Nearly half the commuters who have used the toll lanes report using the lanes once per week or less.
• Surprisingly, the need to be on time for a commitment was an infrequently cited reason for using the toll lanes.
• The total ADT on SR 91 increased 14% in the first year following the capacity increase resulting from opening the toll lanes. Evaluators estimate that just under 60% of the first year growth in ADT is traffic induced by improved travel conditions.
• Changes observed in the overall peak period trip purpose breakdown indicate that most of the new trips induced by improved travel conditions were for non-work purposes. The majority of these new trips used the free lanes.
• The increased capacity from adding two new toll lanes in each direction substantially reduced peak period freeway congestion on SR 91, giving short-term travel time benefits to all commuters in the corridor.
• In spring 1997, the percentage of SR 91 travelers who used the express lanes ranged from about 7% in the mid-day off-peak, when time savings were minimal, to a high of 35% during the peak hour when delay to freeway users was an estimated 12-13 minutes. These observations imply a value of time for SR 91 commuters of $13-14 per hour.
• Despite the correlation between travel time savings and the percentage of SR 91 traffic using the toll lanes, some toll lane users choose to use the toll lanes under traffic conditions where the expected value of their time savings is clearly less than the tolls paid. Driving comfort and the perception of greater safety were cited by travelers as the principal supplemental benefits motivating this behavior.
• About half of regular SR 91 commuters report they never use the toll lanes. When asked their reasons, the majority (just over 50%) gave reasons indicating that the amount of congestion avoided is not worth the cost. About 20% said that their trip patterns were not conveniently served by the express lanes. Only 10% said they do not approve of the facility and will not participate.
• Travel times of many SR 91 commuters are long compared to most commute corridors in the U.S. The average one-way trip time for SR 91 commuters is over an hour. Travelers with long commutes, especially HOV commuters, report using the express lanes more frequently than persons with short commutes.
• By June 1997, most peak period travelers on SR 91 (about 90%) had obtained FasTrak transponders and most of these (about 80%) obtained their transponders during the first six months of operation.
• Throughout the study period, traffic volumes remained generally stable in the SR 57/60 freeway corridor located roughly parallel to SR 91, about 25 km. (15 mi.) to the north. In addition, field observations showed no association between opening the SR 91 toll lanes and any changes in the HOV traffic using the SR 57/60 corridor. This indicates that the influence of the toll lanes, while locally important, apparently did not induce traveler route shifts at the regional scale.
• Within three months after the SR 91 toll lanes opened, traffic observations on all lanes of the highway showed a greater than 40% jump in the number of peak period high occupancy vehicles carrying three or more people (HOV-3+). During that time, HOV-3+ vehicles paid zero toll.
• There is no indication that the express lanes had any effect on the development of commuter rail patronage in the corridor.
• Ridership on the Route 149 express bus in the SR 91 corridor appears not to have been affected by the express lanes. In addition, there is no evidence that traffic changes influenced the bus operation in any way.
• The accident rate for the section of SR 91 containing the express lanes decreased significantly after the express lanes opened. This most likely reflects the reduced peak period congestion. Over the same 1995-96 period, no significant changes in accident characteristics were found.

Additional results can be obtained by visiting the SR 91 Value-Priced Express Lanes Final Report.

The number of HOV-2 vehicles allowed to participate in QuickRide was limited to ensure existing levels of service on the HOV facility would be maintained.

Like the State Route 91 Express Lanes project and the I-15 FasTrak projects which came before it, the QuickRide project is completely automated using windshield-mounted transponders and overhead readers. Since the project's opening, about 500 transponders have been issued, with average daily trips ranging from 100 to 150 over the first 45 days (with p.m. peak period trips representing 53 percent of the total). It is expected that the number of permits will be increased to between 800 and 1,000 to generate approximately 600 daily users. The Texas Transportation Institute, Houston Metro, and the TxDOT are monitoring and evaluating the project (source: Keane, Tom. FHWA Pricing Team. Congestion Pricing Notes. No. 4, Spring 1998)

Cordon Tolls

In addition to cordon pricing, road pricing was also introduced in some expressways, and it is expected that eventually all major freeways will be priced. Unlike ALS, road pricing is performed electronically from the beginning. The system used is card-based.

ALS has succeeded in decreasing the proportion of solo drivers, as well as shifting vehicle trips from the peak to the non-peak hours. In fact, it has been found that average speeds during the non-peak are slower than during the peak, and moreover, that a brief rush period occurs right before and right after the ALS is in operation. Some of these problems have been partially corrected by adopting a step pricing scheme, instead of a flat price for the whole restricted access period. More information can be obtained by visiting Singapore's Land Transport Authority.

• 12.5 percent of peak-period trips being shifted to off-peak travel times.
• Up to 5 percent of weekday trips and 15 percent of Saturday trips being shifted from automobile to transit.
• A 7 percent increase in HOV trips.

One of the more interesting findings from the study was that several participants continued their 'modified' travel patterns even after the trial ended. As a result, demand for park and ride facilities and public transit increased after the study. In addition to the general finding that pricing does affect travel behavior, researchers found that simply providing information on the availability of alternative transportation options and the specific costs and benefits of each, enhances the success of variable pricing demonstrations. Specifically, researchers stated that alternatives may need to be experienced, and their pros and cons clearly understood, before they are accepted as viable options.

Trondheim is perhaps the world's first application of area congestion pricing since the toll structure provides disincentives to car use in the area in business hours and especially during the morning peak. There are also toll rings in operation in Oslo and Bergen (the 1st and 2nd cities) and in Singapore, but none of these are yet structured to price peak hour use at a premium.

The Trondheim toll ring project was well marketed prior to operation so that 80 percent of the motorists entering the city center had pre-paid for their AVI tags, known as the "Q-free tag." Over 30,000 motorists had subscribed for the Q-free tag system before it opened. By 1993, the number of subscriptions had jumped to 64,000. The majority of the lanes are reserved for Q-free drivers with only a 0.3 percent violation rate. Revenues are 5 times the toll plaza capital and operating expenses. Trondheim's ring presently produces about $25m profit a year. The profits are used for financing road infrastructure, with some earmarking for public transit and pedestrian and bicycle facilities.

Contrary to the fears of some businesses inside the ring, the imposition of tolls has not hurt the economy there. The ring tolls of Trondheim resulted in a 10% reduction in central area traffic during toll hours and an 8% increase outside toll hours, and an overall decrease of 4%, according to figures supplied by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration for 1990 to 1993. Weekday bus travel has increased by 7 percent.

Other Projects

In addition to the projects previously described, several proposals and feasibility studies have been completed in the United States:

• Sonoma County, California: A feasibility study initiated by CalTrans and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission in December 1996 was conducted to examine the possibility of adding priced express lanes in the median of U.S. 101 over a 32-km corridor in Sonoma County between Petaluma and Santa Rosa. The final report available from MTC addresses potential pricing structures, potential usage, impacts on traffic, and estimated construction cost and revenues.
• Dallas, Texas: A six-lane HOT facility has been proposed to the TxDOT for the LBJ freeway in North Dallas.
• Maryland, Virginia: The Maryland DOT is conducting an extensive study of whether to implement congestion pricing throughout the Washington D.C. area. The final report is scheduled for September of 2000.

Catling, Ian. Giving the Virtual Gantry Teeth, January/February 2000 issue of ITS International.

Clark, Julie. "Sky High Tolling", January/February 2000 issue of ITS International.

"Congestion Pricing Around the World." Congestion Pricing Notes. No. 4, Spring 1996.

Field, B.G. "From Area Licensing to Electronic Road Pricing: A Case Study in Vehicle Restraint". In: IVHS and Vehicle Communications. Society of Automotive Engineers: Warrendale, PA, 1991.

Hug, Klaus, Rudiger Mock-Hecker and Julian Wurtenberger. "Transport Demand Management by Electronic Fee Collection in a Zone-based Pricing Scheme". Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, 1997.

Keane, Tom. FHWA Pricing Team. Congestion Pricing Notes. No. 4, Spring 1998.

Orski, Kenneth. "High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) Lanes and Value Pricing: A Preliminary Assessment". ITE Journal. June 1998.

Smith, Theresa. FHWA Pricing Team. Congestion Pricing Notes. No. 3, Fall 1997.

Soo, C. "ERP Cuts Congestion in Singapore". Traffic Technology International, June/July 1998.

Tellis, R,; Khisty, C.; "Assessment of the Actual Cost of Automobile Travel on Urban Highways," Transportation Congress, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 1995 Conference.

Urban Mobility Corporation; Innovation Briefs; May/June 1997).

Williams, Carl."Are HOV Lanes Alone Effective?" ENR. September 23, 1996.

Links

Evaluation of Leeway congestion pricing program in Florida
http://www.cutr.eng.usf.edu/its/varprice.htm

Description of Route 91 express lanes in California
http://www.91expresslanes.com/

Author: Lauren Smith.  Last update: 05/01/02